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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to U.CA. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e), inasmuch as it is an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case, not 
involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Court err in reversing the burden of proof and requiring Mr. Valdez to 
prove that he is an Indian? It is clearly established that when jurisdiction is challenged, 
the burden of proof is upon the State to establish jurisdiction. State v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d 
466, 468 (Utah App. 1988). This is a question of law, reviewed on appeal for 
correctness. Corbett v. Seamons. 904 P.2d 229 (Utah 1995). 
2. Did the Court err in determining that 5/16 Indian blood and recognition by at 
least two Indian tribes is insufficient to establish Indian status? This is a question of law, 
accorded no particular deference on appeal. Corbett v. Seamons. 904 P.2d 229 (Utah 
1995). The State of Utah has already clearly found that "Five-sixteenths Indian blood 
clearly qualifies as a 'significant percentage', the historical debate treated in the cases 
focusing on whether two-sixteenths is enough/' State v. Hagen. 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah 
App. 1990)(Emphasis is original), reversed on other grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1993), 
affWHagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 114 S.Ct. 958, 127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994). 
3. Did the Court err in determining that it had jurisdiction? Whether a district 
court has jurisdiction to hear a criminal matter is a question of law for the court. U.CA. 
§76-1-501(3), State v. Pavne. 892 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1995). As such, it is accorded no 
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particular deference on appeal. Corbett v. Seamons. 904 P.2d 229 (Utah 1995). 
Issues 1 through 3 were thoroughly tried before the trial court as the subject of 
four separate hearings on December 8, 1999, February 15, 2000, March 7, 2000, and May 
23, 2000, extensive briefs by counsel, and a separate pre-trial ruling. 
4. Did the Court err in excluding evidence that the Court itself had elicited from 
Mr. Valdez? This is a question of law, entitled to no particular deference on appeal. 
Corbett v. Seamons, 904 P.2d 229 (Utah 1995). Objection to this issue was raised at die 
March 7, 2000, hearing (Transcript, March 7, 2000, page 25), argued in the briefs, and 
again argued on May 23, 2000. (Transcript, May 23, 2000, page 4). 
5. Was Mr. Valdez unduly prejudiced by bias on the part of the trial judge? This is 
a mixed question of law and fact. The questions of fact are reviewed for clear error, 
questions of law for correctness, and application of the law to the facts is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. State Department of Human Service ex rel. Parker v. Irizarrv. 945 
P.2d 676 (1997). This was the subject of a distinct Motion on December 15, 2000, as well 
as an Order of Judge John Anderson entered on January 3, 2001. 
6. Did die Court err in allowing a jury instruction that required the jury to find that 
the officer knew or should have known that Mr. Valdez was intoxicated before ordering 
him to drive a motor vehicle? This is a question of law, entitled to no particular 
deference on appeal. Corbett v. Seamons. 904 P.2d 229 (Utah 1995). This issue was 
preserved as an objection to jury instructions in chambers. (Trial transcript, February 9, 
2001, pages 334-335). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I Section 7, Utah Constitution 
Vth and XIV11 Amendments, United States Constitution 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 29(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
U.C.A. §76-1-501(3) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/RELEVANT FACTS 
Mr. Valdez was arraigned in the Eighth District Court in Uintah County on 
August 16, 1999, on a charge of DUI with injury, a Class A Misdemeanor. At that time 
he raised the issue of jurisdiction based on the fact that he is an Indian. Hearings were 
held on the matter on December 8, 1999, February 15, 2000, March 7, 2000, and May 23, 
2000. On May 23, 2000, Judge A. Lynn Payne ruled that the State had jurisdiction, and 
the matter was set for trial. 
In a collateral matter, Mr. Valdez challenged State jurisdiction in a case appealed 
de novo from the Uintah County Justice Court. On January 18, 2000, the same Judge 
Payne issued a bench warrant for Mr. Valdez for alleged failure to appear. Mr. Valdez 
turned himself in to custody voluntarily, and the warrant was recalled on January 21, 
2000. However, the judge would not release $600 in bail money posted by the 
Timpanogos Tribe, but rather, ordered the money applied as payment of a fine on a 
matter for which Mr. Valdez had never been convicted. The matter regarding the money 
was brought to the attention of the Judicial Conduct Commission. The case was dismissed 
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without prejudice on October 11, 2000, and the money returned on November 14, 2000. 
A Motion to Disqualify the judge on the current matter was filed on December 14, 2000, 
and denied by the presiding judge on January 3, 2001. 
Trial on the current matter was held before a jury on February 9, 2001, at which 
time Mr. Valdez was found guilty. Sentence was pronounced on February 13, 2001, but 
stayed upon the court's issuance of a Certificate of Probable Cause. 
Mr. Valdez is an Indian. By descent, he is, in fact, 29/32 Native American, and he 
looks it. He is an enrolled member of the Timpanogos Tribe. (Appeal record 489, page 
33). In addition, he is 5/16 Sioux through his mother (262, paragraph 5) and Navajo 
through his father. (489, page 23, line 2). Mr. Valdez is married to an enrolled member of 
the Ute Tribe, and resides on the Uinta Valley Reserve. (489, page 101). On March 21, 
1999, police officers employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs were called to an incident 
at a tavern located on tribal land. (484, page 211). Mr. Valdez, although intoxicated at the 
time, was ordered by a tribal officer to get in a vehicle with Mrs. Valdez and some other 
individuals and drive away from the scene. A few minutes later, Mr. Valdez rolled the 
vehicle in an irrigation ditch, also on tribal land. While Mrs. Valdez was being extracted 
from the vehicle by die officers, she incurred some injury. (484, pages 300-301). Mr. 
Valdez was arrested for Driving Under the Influence. He was originally detained by BIA 
police, but was subsequently charged in Uintah County. (484, page 223). 
At a hearing on December 8, 1999, the State stipulated that the alleged incident did 
occur in Indian country, and that if Mr. Valdez is in fact an Indian, the State would not 
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have jurisdiction. (485, page 2). The court then determined that Mr. Valdez would have 
the burden of proof to establish that he is an Indian. (485, pages 13-14). At a hearing on 
March 7, 2000, the Court received undisputed evidence that Mr. Valdez is 5/16 Sioux, 
through his mother. (262, paragraph 5). The trial judge himself elicited testimony from 
Mr. Valdez's mother that Mr. Valdez' father is Navajo, but immediately ruled that this 
evidence must be excluded because it was not provided to the State prior to the hearing. 
However, although Mr. Valdez's counsel had not been provided with this information 
ahead of time, counsel for the State conceded that she had prior knowledge. (489, pages 
23-29). There was also undisputed testimony that Mr. Valdez is recognized as an Indian 
by both the Rosebud Sioux and Timpanogos Tribes, as well as substantial evidence that 
he is recognized as an Indian by the Ute Tribe. (489, pages 33, 55-60, 76-94, 101-104, 
116-118). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court subsequently ruled that Mr. Valdez is 
not an Indian, and was therefore subject to State jurisdiction. (259). 
Trial was held before a jury on February 9, 2001. At trial, Mr. Valdez requested a 
jury instruction indicating that if the jury found that he was intoxicated, but that while 
Mr. Valdez was intoxicated, a peace officer nevertheless ordered him to drive, the jury 
must find him not guilty of DUI. (397-405, 484, pages 7-24, 321-330). Over the objection 
of Mr. Valdez, the Court included in the jury instruction that the officer must first have 
known or reasonably should have known that Mr. Valdez was intoxicated before ordering 
him to drive. (484, page 334). After hearing the evidence, the jury found Mr. Valdez 
guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol with Bodily Injury, a Class A 
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Misdemeanor. Mr. Valdez was sentenced and filed a Notice of Appeal on February 13, 
2001. (484, page 369). 
On February 22, 2001, Mr. Valdez requested a Certificate of Probable Cause, 
suspending the imposition of sentence pending this appeal. Although the trial judge 
demanded extended briefing in support of the application, the State stipulated that the 
Certificate be issued without further argument. (459-470). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. It is clearly established that when jurisdiction is challenged, the burden of 
proof is upon the State to establish jurisdiction. It is also clear that once a party has 
asserted that he is an Indian, it is up to the State to disprove this. Mr. Valdez amply 
proved that he is an Indian under both State and Federal law. The State presented no 
evidence of non-Indian lineage, and in fact conceded that Mr. Valdez qualified as an 
Indian under State law. Nevertheless, the court refused to recognize even the prima facie 
case presented by the Appellant, then required no evidence from the State. 
B. The State of Utah has already clearly found that "Five-sixteenths Indian blood 
clearly qualifies as a * significant percentage', the historical debate treated in the cases 
focusing on whether two-sixteenths is enough." Ignoring evidence of an even greater 
Indian blood quantum, and with no evidence whatsoever of non-Indian heritage, and 
despite finding that the Appellant possessed 5/16 Indian blood and is recognized as an 
Indian by at least two different Indian Tribes, the Court nevertheless ruled, contrary to 
law, that Appellant did not possess enough Indian blood to qualify as an Indian. 
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C. Federal law draws a clear distinction between sovereign rights of Indians and 
government benefits. The evidence clearly established that Mr. Valdez possessed both 
sovereign treaty rights and eligibility for government benefits, making him an Indian for 
all legal purposes. Notwithstanding this State and Federal standard, the court insisted that 
only Indians officially enrolled in a tribe registered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs could 
claim Indian status. The court's position has no basis in law. 
D. Upon engaging the State's first witness in direct examination, the court itself 
elicited the fact that Mr. Valdez' father is a Navajo. This information was unknown to 
defense counsel, but was known to the prosecutor. This information would have 
established indisputably that Mr. Valdez is an Indian, as it would have established a 
53/64 blood quantum. 1/64 is sufficient for federal purposes. The court excluded this 
evidence, erroneously citing principles of fairness to counsel. 
E. In a collateral proceeding concurrent with the proceedings in this matter, Judge 
Payne had Mr. Valdez arrested for failure to appear at a hearing of which Mr. Valdez was 
never notified. The bail money posted by the Timpanogos Tribe was then ordered 
forfeited to pay a fine on a charge for which Mr. Valdez was never convicted. The money 
was only returned after the Tribe notified the Judicial Conduct Commission. Mr. Valdez 
was unduly prejudiced by bias on the part of the trial judge. 
F. Mr. Valdez was ordered by a peace officer to drive when Mr. Valdez was 
already clearly intoxicated. The same officer then arrested him when Mr. Valdez had an 
accident a few hundred yards away. The Court erred in allowing a jury instruction that 
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required the jury to find that the officer knew or should have known that Mr. Valdez was 
intoxicated before ordering him to drive a motor vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The Court erred in reversing the burden of proof and requiring Mr. Valdez to prove 
that he is an Indian. 
Whether a district court has jurisdiction to hear a criminal matter is a question of 
law for the court. U.C A §76-1-501(3), State v. Pavne. 892 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1995). As 
such, it is accorded no particular deference on appeal. Corbett v. Seamons, 904 P.2d 229 
(Utah 1995). It is clearly established that when jurisdiction is challenged, the burden of 
proof is upon the State to establish jurisdiction. State v. Sorenson. 758 P.2d 466, 468 
(Utah App. 1988). To shift "the burden of proof on the fact of jurisdiction to defendant 
[is] in violation of the due process clause of Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution." State v. 
Sorenson. 758 P.2d at 470. 
At the hearing on December 18, 1999, the Court explicitly shifted the burden of 
proof to Mr. Valdez, in violation of Defendant's right to due process. (485, pages 13-14). 
The Court reasoned that the State could not prove Mr. Valdez was not Indian until Mr. 
Valdez had proven that he was. (485, page 14). This overlooked the State's obvious 
preliminary burden to simply prove sufficient non-Indian blood, something for which the 
State presented no evidence whatsoever. 
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Instead, the court applied an unyielding standard of official enrollment in a tribe 
recognized by the Secretary of the Interior (259-263, 490, pages 21-23), a standard not 
required by either State or Federal law, and having nothing to do with the State's burden 
of proof. The court seemed obsessed with addressing the fact that Mr. Valdez' mother, 
Rosanna Valdez, was terminated as a Ute Indian. (260, 263). Mrs. Valdez was terminated 
as a Ute Indian for the simple reason that she possesses no Ute blood whatsoever. Her 
termination, however, had no effect on her status as a Sioux or a Timpanoag, and no 
effect whatsoever on Mr. Valdez' father's status as a Navajo. For this reason, Mr. Valdez 
made no effort to present any evidence of present or former Ute membership. 
In essence, the court did not require the State to show that Mr. Valdez was not 
Indian, but instead invented a rule that termination as to one ancestor in one tribe 
amounted to termination as to all ancestors in all tribes. (259-260). The rule set forth in 
Sorenson has not been superseded. Mr. Valdez had no obligation to prove that he was an 
Indian, which he nevertheless did, but the State did have an obligation to at least show, at 
the very least, some non-Indian ancestry, which it did not do. The court erred as a matter 
of law, and the ruling on jurisdiction should be reversed. 
II 
The Court erred in determining that 5/16 Indian blood and recognition by at least 
two Indian tribes is insufficient to establish Indian status. 
The undisputed finding is that Mr. Valdez is 5/16 Sioux. The State of Utah has 
already clearly found that "Five-sixteenths Indian blood clearly qualifies as a 'significant 
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percentage', the historical debate treated in the cases focusing on whether two-sixteenths 
is enough." State v. Hagen. 802 P.2d 745, 747 (Utah App. 1990)(Emphasis is original), 
reversed on other grounds, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 1993), aff'd Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 
399, 114 S.Ct. 958, 127 L.Ed.2d 252 (1994). The State even conceded at the evidentiary 
hearing that Mr. Valdez qualified as an Indian under Hagen. (489, page 24). Ignoring the 
Navajo and Timpanogos lineage, the court in fact found that Mr. Valdez possessed 5/16 
Indian blood through the Sioux Tribe. (262). This is clearly sufficient Indian lineage for 
those who emphasize lineage only*, and clearly sufficient under State law. 
The Hagen court also noted that "formal enrollment in a federally recognized 
tribe is not required." IdL "Recognition" as an Indian within a federally recognized tribe 
does not require formal "enrollment". Waldron v. United States. 143 Fed. 413 (C.C.S.D. 
1905)(Holding that common law did not apply to Indians of Sioux Nation, and that 
Secretary of the Interior must recognize the unenrolled daughter of a Sioux Indian based 
upon the custom of the tribe). This principle was confirmed in Mr. Valdez' case by 
numerous qualified Indian witnesses. The evidence was clear that Mr. Valdez is 
recognized as an Indian by both the Sioux and Timpanogos Tribes. Indeed, there was 
ample evidence that Mr. Valdez is recognized as an Indian by the Ute Tribe, the one tribe 
which the court seemed to consider genuinely Indian. (489, pages 33, 55-60, 76-94, 101-
*Among Indians, the emphasis placed on lineage by non-Indians is perplexing. This was 
demonstrated by the poignant testimony of Wendell Navanick, a highly-placed member 
of the Ute Tribe fully knowledgeable as to what constitutes an Indian. (489, pages 78-84). 
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104, 116-118). 
The court's own finding that Mr. Valdez is at least 5/16 Indian, and that he is 
recognized as such by at least two tribes (261-263), contradicts the court's own finding 
that Mr. Valdez is not an Indian. Mr. Valdez is an Indian as a matter of law, and the court 
erred as a matter of law in finding otherwise. 
ni 
The Court erred in determining that it had jurisdiction. 
In the recent case of Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 
2002), the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals drew a clear distinction between Indian rights 
and privileges on the one hand, and benefits and services for Indians on the other. 286 
F.3d at 1203. The court pointed out that Indian rights and privileges pre-date the 
existence of the United States, and are not premised upon recognition by the Secretary of 
the Interior. These rights of sovereignty can only be abrogated by treaty or act of 
Congress. Id at 1202. The court said this specifically in regard to the Timpanogos Tribe, 
of which Mr. Valdez is an enrolled member. Id at 1204. As a member of the Tribe, Mr. 
Valdez has the right to be tried before an Indian tribunal for offenses committed in Indian 
country. The evidence was clear and uncontradicted that the Timpanogos Tribe is able to 
exercise such authority. (489, pages 122-123). 
In contrast to rights and privileges, the 10th Circuit ruled that benefits and services, 
such as Indian Health Services, require as a prerequisite recognition by a tribe which is 
itself recognized by the Secretary of the Interior. 286 F.3d at 1204. The court did not 
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limit such services to formally enrolled members, but left intact the rule allowing tribes to 
recognize whomever they choose, based on tribal criteria. Waldron v. United States, 143 
Fed. 413 (C.C.S.D. 1905). The evidence presented by Dr. Ebbert was unequivocal that 
Mr. Valdez qualifies for benefits and services because of his connection with the 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe. (489, pages 55-60). 
Thus, Mr. Valdez qualifies as an Indian both as to rights and privileges and as to 
benefits and services. Oddly, the trial court focused exclusively on eligibility for services. 
After the court received Dr. Ebbert's testimony that Mr. Valdez qualifies for services, 
which both Dr. Ebbert and the 10th Circuit make clear requires Indian status, it found that 
even though Mr. Valdez qualified for services, he wasn't receiving enough services. (490, 
page 27, lines 20-21). Just as the court applied an erroneous standard to blood quantum, it 
likewise applied a non-existent standard as to quantum of services received. The issue 
here is being an Indian, not being a Nazi. Indian status requires neither 100% Indian 
blood, nor 100% dependence on federal welfare. 29/32 blood quantum and unequivical 
qualification for Indian Health Services is more than sufficient. 
IV 
The Court erred in excluding evidence that the Court itself had elicited from Mr. 
Valdez. 
At the evidentiary hearing on May 23, 2000, the Court itself questioned Rosanna 
Valdez, Mr. Valdez's mother. At that time she indicated that the Defendant's father was 
Navajo. (489, page 23) This evidence would have established that Defendant is over 
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13/16 Indian, and thus indisputably Indian for jurisdictional purposes. At that point the 
burden would have fallen upon the prosecutor to show that Mr. Valdez' father was 
something less than full-blooded Navajo. The prosecutor acknowledged that she did in 
fact know that the Defendant's father was Navajo (489, page 25), and counsel for the 
Defendant pointed out that he had requested all such relevant information in his Rule 16 
Discovery Request. (489, pages 26-30). The Court nevertheless promptly excluded the 
evidence, on the basis that this information had not been provided to the State in 
Discovery. (489, pages 31-32). However, it was clearly established that it was Defense 
counsel, not the State, who had been denied this information. (489, pages 23-32). 
At the same time, althought preaching on the necessity of limiting evidence to 
matters provided in Discovery, the court allowed the State to bring in evidence pertaining 
to Ute termination, none of which was provided to defense counsel prior to the hearing, 
and which, moreover, was irrelevant. (489, pages 15-18, 27-28). The State's burden, as 
perceived by the court, was to refute Mr. Valdez' evidence. Mr. Valdez very deliberately 
and explicitly presented no evidence as to Ute lineage. (489, page 17). Mr. Valdez 
possesses no Ute lineage. Evidence as to Ute termination could only have relevance to 
refute evidence of Ute lineage. Absent evidence of such lineage, there was no legitimate 
purpose in introducing evidence of termination. This was clearly explained to the court 
before the evidence was ever introduced. (489, page 17). "Evidence which is not relevant 
is not admissable." Utah Rule of Evidence 402. The only purpose such evidence could 
serve in this case was to support prejudicial bias on the part of the judge. 
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The purpose in excluding evidence not provided in Discovery is to prevent the 
opposing party from being prejudiced. But there can be no prejudice if neither party was 
provided with the information, and even less if the party who would otherwise claim 
prejudice was in fact the only party who possessed the information ahead of time. If 
there is no evidence of prejudice, then the evidence cannot be excluded. State v. 
Hopkins. 989 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1999). There was thus no reason to exclude the evidence 
of Navajo heritage. 
The court's lopsided approach has no justification. If the evidence regarding 
termination was admissable despite being both undisclosed and irrelevant, the evidence 
regarding Navajo heritage should have come in as well. If the evidence regarding Mr. 
Valdez' father was inadmissable, even though known to the prosecutor and requested in 
Discovery, then the evidence regarding Ute termination should likewise have been 
excluded. As it was the judge relied on irrelevant information and refused to consider 
highly probative testimony, making a mockery of the Rules of Evidence, clearly an error 
as a matter of law. 
V 
Mr. Valdez was unduly prejudiced by bias on the part of the trial judge. 
Taken by itself, Judge Payne's conduct of the jurisdictional hearing would merit 
only an appeal on its legal findings. However, taken together with the judge's conduct 
throughout this and the collateral proceedings, a larger pattern of bias becomes apparent. 
Nowhere was this more clear than when he excluded evidence he himself had elicited. 
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In the collateral matter of State v. Valdez. Case no. 991800374, Mr. Valdez also 
challenged State jurisdiction. (485). By stipulation of the State, the matter was set for a 
jurisdictional hearing on March 7, 2000, which would resolve the jurisdictional issue on 
both that and the present case. Mr. Valdez diligently checked the court records during this 
time to make sure no hearings were scheduled. Nevertheless, on January 18, 2000, Judge 
Payne issued a bench warrant against Mr. Valdez for failure to appear at a hearing for 
which Mr. Valdez had received no notice whatsoever. (325-421, 486). When the 
Timpanogos Tribe posted $600.00 cash bail, Judge Payne ordered that the money be 
applied against a fine that had never been imposed, on a charge to which a plea had never 
been taken and for which Mr. Valdez had never been convicted. (325-421, 487). The case 
itself was dismissed without prejudice on October 11, 2000. (491 or 492). Judge Payne 
continued to deny any knowledge about the matter and only ordered the money returned 
after the matter was brought to the attention of the Judicial Conduct Commission. The 
money was finally returned to the Tribe on November 14, 2000. (325-421). 
In the conduct of the jurisdiction hearing itself, he gave the prosecution repeated 
opportunities to disprove Mr. Valdez' status as an Indian after Ms. Stringham had 
conceded his Indian status on up to three different occasions. (489, page 24). He then 
permitted Ms. Stringham to argue a position contrary to the State's own position in the 
Hagen case (490, pages 20-21), and reversed the burden of proof and placed it upon Mr. 
Valdez. (485, pages 13-14). His attitude toward Wendell Navanick, a Ute tribal elder and 
former member of the Ute Tribe's highest governing body, was downright derisive (490, 
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pages 20-29), and his attitude toward Carlos Iorg, a member of the tribal council of the 
Timpanogos Tribe, was astonished and cynical (489, page 125, 490, pages 31-32). 
He was all too willing to accept Ms. Hansen's representations regarding the 
practices of the Ute Tribe, notwithstanding overwhelming contrary testimony. Counsel 
for Mr. Valdez questioned Ms. Hansen's authority to speak on behalf of the Ute Tribe. 
While it is unusual to question an attorney's authority, it is no different than questioning 
jurisdiction, and a matter which can and should be demonstrated upon demand. Judge 
Payne went to great lengths to justify Ms. Hansen's supposed authority to practice law, 
and was only stopped when Ms. Hansen herself pointed out that she's not licensed in 
Utah. (489, pages 62-72). The promised amicus brief never came, Ms. Hansen never 
obtained licensure in Utah, and in fact, Ms. Hansen is no longer employed by the Ute 
Tribe. 
At the close of the jurisdiction hearing, believing that the entire matter pertained to 
a trial de novo from justice court (on a matter which has since been dismissed) Judge 
Payne went to great lengths to say what a marvelous issue he thought this case would 
make on appeal, and feigned great regret that the matter supposedly could not be appealed 
under State law. (490, page 24). He was visibly agitated when he learned that the matter 
was in fact over a Class A Misdemeanor, subject to trial in District Court, and fully 
eligible for appeal. At that point he rapidly closed the hearing, and no longer seemed to 
consider the case a marvelous matter for appeal. (490, pages 39-43). 
These strained efforts to find in favor of the State against clear and substantial law 
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and evidence to the contrary were duly brought to the court's attention prior to trial, 
pursuant to Rule 29(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, the motion to 
disqualify Judge Payne was denied. (321-369). 
Subsequent to sentencing, Mr. Valdez requested that imposition of sentence be 
stayed pending this appeal. The sentence was 10 days in jail and a $1,000 fine on a Class 
A Misdemeanor, nearly two years after the original offense. (452-454). Mr. Valdez was 
clearly not a danger to society on account of this matter. Notwithstanding the relative 
triviality of the crime and sentence themselves, Judge Payne insisted that Mr. Valdez file 
an Application for Certificate of Probable Cause and fully brief the issue. (455-470) Mr. 
Valdez was spared another hearing only because the prosecutor graciously stipulated not 
to oppose the request. (475). 
Taken individually, and except for the matter of the $600.00 bail, which required 
intervention by the Judicial Conduct Commission, each of these matters would merely 
qualify as a matter for appeal. However, taken collectively, it is clear that Judge Payne 
possessed a distinct bias against Mr. Valdez and the Timpanogos Tribe. This bias clouded 
the judge's impartiality, and Mr. Valdez was unduly prejudiced thereby. The ruling as to 
jurisdiction should thus be vacated. Judge Anderson also erred in denying the Motion to 
Disqualify Judge Payne, and the verdict of the court should likewise be vacated. 
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VI 
The Court erred in allowing a jury instruction that required the jury to find that the 
officer knew or should have known that the Mr. Valdez was intoxicated before 
ordering him to drive a motor vehicle. 
At trial, Mr. Valdez proposed to instruct the jury that if it found that he was 
intoxicated, but that while Mr. Valdez was intoxicated a peace officer nevertheless 
ordered Mr. Valdez to drive, the jury must find him not guilty. The evidence indicated 
not only that Mr. Valdez knew himself that he was intoxicated, but that he and those with 
him took steps to get a ride from a non-intoxicated driver, and were directly hindered by 
the officer. (484, pages 275-290, 298-306). 
The defense of estoppel when a peace officer orders a party to commit an act for 
which the party is then criminally charged has not been clearly defined under Utah law, 
but has been addressed in many other jurisdictions. Schiff v. People. I l l Colo. 333, 141 
P.2d 892 (1943); People v. Donovan. 279 N. Y.S.2d 404 (1967). States vary as to 
whether or not they require as an element of the defense that the officer knew or should 
have known that the defendant was intoxicated, or to what degree such knowledge is 
required. People v. Jensen. 37 IU.App.3d 1010, 347 N.E.2d 371, 375-76 (Illinois, 1976); 
State v. Bisson. 491 A.2d 544 (Maine, 1985); and City of Hamilton v. Collier. 44 Ohio 
App.2d 419, 339 N.E.2d 851, 853 (Ohio, 1975). 
The matter is perhaps best stated, however, in the case of People v. Donovan. 53 
Misc.2d 687, 279 N. Y.S.2d 404 (Ct.Spec.Sess. 1967). In that case, police officers found 
the defendant asleep in a homeowner's driveway, and ordered her to leave. When she 
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refused, the officers drove off, but parked a block away in order to keep the driveway in 
sight. When the defendant drove out of the driveway shortly thereafter, she was arrested 
and charged with driving while impaired. In holding that the officer's conduct estopped 
the State from prosecuting the defendant, the court noted: 
There can be no doubt that defendant here was keenly disappointed 
in the actions of the police who suggested that she drive her car and then 
arrested her when she did. It may be said that defendant knew that she was 
not in fit condition to drive, and that she should have explained this to the 
police. But the average citizen does not argue with uniformed authority; 
when the law suggests "Move on", the healthy instinct is to get going. 
Moreover, one in defendant's condition cannot be expected to discuss with 
reasoned calm the merits and dangers of the proposed action. 
Id, 279 N.Y.S.2d 404, at 406. 
This very line of reasoning was in fact considered by the court, but rejected, over 
the objection of Mr. Valdez. Instead, the court required a degree of observation on the 
part of the officer and of cooperation on the part of Mr. Valdez that the New York court 
found was plainly impractical under such circumstances. It was Mr. Valdez's culpability 
in a criminal matter that was ultimately at issue, not that of the officer.in a civil matter. 
The evidence indicated that, but for the insistence of the officer, Mr. Valdez would have 
taken the appropriate steps to avoid having to drive. That is why knowledge of Mr. 
Valdez5 intoxication on the part of the officer was not a necessary element of the defense. 
Had the court excluded paragraph 2 from jury instruction 20, as suggested by the 
Defendant and considered by the court, it is highly likely that the jury would have found 
Mr. Valdez not guilty. Inclusion of paragraph 2 required the jury to find an additional 
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essential element. Because it is not possible to discern from the record if, but for this 
element, the jury would have acquitted Mr. Valdez, inclusion of this paragraph 
constituted prejudicial error, and the verdict should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Valdez is an Indian, and clearly established so as a matter of law. The trial 
court erred in reversing the burden of proof and placing it on Mr. Valdez, and after 
having done so, it ignored both the facts and the law. Because Mr. Valdez is an Indian, 
charged with an offense in Indian country, the State of Utah cannot exercise jurisdiction 
over him, and the verdict of the trial court must be vacated for want of jurisdiction. 
Aside from the jurisdictional issue, Mr. Valdez case was unduly prejudiced by 
manifest bias on the part of the trial judge. The trial court also erroneously conditioned an 
instruction on estoppel by requiring a finding that the police officer knew Mr. Valdez was 
already intoxicated when he ordered Mr. Valdez to drive. This was prejudicial error, and 
requires reversal. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 2002. 
Michael L. Humiston 
Attorney for Appellant 
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JOANNBMCJ<LL CLERK 
BY LA DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSE RICHARD VALDEZ, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CASE NO. 995800010 
Judge A. Lynn Payne 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 
having come on for oral argument on the 23rd day of May, 2000, 
before the Honorable A. Lynn Payne. The State was presented by 
JoAnn B. Stringham, Uintah County Attorney. The defendant was 
personally present and represented by counsel, Michael L. 
Humiston. The Court heard oral arguments from both parties, and 
considered the briefs submitted by the parties in this matter. 
Based upon the same, the Court hereby enters the following 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendant was stopped on trust land within the 
reservation (within "Indian Country") by B.I.A. Officer LaRose 
for suspected driving under the influence of alcohol. Officer 
LaRose received information that the defendant was not an 
enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe, and therefore 
requested the assistance of the Uintah County Sheriff's Office. 
Officer LaRose testified that he cannot refer any criminal 
defendants into tribal court unless they are enrolled members of 
a federally recognized tribe. Defendant was arrested by the 
Uintah County officer and cited into this court. 
2. Defendant is not enrolled in any federally recognized 
Indian Tribe. There was testimony that he was enrolled in the 
Timpanogos Tribe. The Timpanogos Tribe is not a federally 
recognized tribe. 
3. Defendant's mother, Rosanna Faye (Hackford) Valdez is a 
terminated Ute. Her name appears in the Federal Register as number 
144 on the rolls of the terminated Utes (Exhibit 2). Other 
information listed in the Federal Register is her date of birth and 
that her total Indian blood is 7/16. 
4. Rosanna Valdez is an enrolled member of the Rosebud 
Sioux, a federally recognized tribe located in South Dakota. She 
has 3/8 Indian blood of the Rosebud Sioux. She has 2/8 Indian 
blood of the Santee Sioux, a federally recognized tribe in 
Nebraska, but is not an enrolled member. She considers herself and 
the defendant Indians. 
5. Defendant has 3/16 Rosebud Sioux Indian blood and 2/16 
Santee Sioux Indian blood through his mother for a total of 5/16 
Indian blood. There was no evidence he inherited any Indian blood 
through his father. 
6. Defendant resides within the boundaries of the Uintah-
Ouray Indian Reservation in Utah. He is married to an enrolled 
member of the Ute Indian Tribe. 
7. Defendant receives medical services at the Indian Health 
Center located on the reservation. Dr. Ebbert testified that the 
criteria for receiving such services is that a person be an 
enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe or a descendant of 
such a person. 
8. Defendant receives food services through the Ute Tribe. 
Defendant's mother-in-law, Geneva Accuwanna, works at the Food 
Distribution Services and testified that the eligibility criteria 
is that a person reside on the Ute Reservation and have a low 
income. Non-Indians can receive such services if they met the 
criteria. 
9. Mrs. Valdez, defendant's wife, testified that she has 
known the defendant for six years and considers him an Indian. She 
is an enrolled member of the Ute Tribe and they live on the Uintah 
Ouray Indian Reservation. They follow the customs and manner of 
the Ute Tribe by attending certain Ute ceremonies such as the pow-
wows, sun dance, and bear dance. Non Indians, such as Caucasians, 
can and do attend the same ceremonies. 
10. Wendall Navanick testified he would consider someone an 
Indian if he had 1/64% Indian blood. He recognizes a person as an 
Indian depending on the feelings he has that they are Indian. He 
believes a person can be a member of the Ute Tribe even if they are 
not enrolled, which is contrary to the law. He believes that the 
Ute Termination Act has no effect, which is contrary to the law. 
He doesn't know the defendant and is not familiar with his customs. 
He believes that the Ute Tribe has jurisdiction over the defendant. 
All Indians remain Indians regardless of their status. 
11. Carl Iorg testified that the Timpanogos Tribe is not 
recognized by the federal government. To be a member a person must 
have 1/64% Indian blood from ancestors that, at the time the 
pioneers arrived, were within the area known now as Utah. 
Defendant is considered a member of the Timpanogos Tribe. 
12. Five witnesses testified that they considered the 
defendant an Indian: Wendell Navanick, defendant's wife, 
defendant's mother, Carl Iorg, and J.T. Murray. There was no 
evidence that these individuals associated for their mutual benefit 
or based on friendship, other than the mother and wife are related 
by marriage. The only common trait they all share is that they 
live within the Reservation boundaries. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes as 
follows: 
1. Defendant has a significant degree of Indian blood for 
purposes of federal jurisdiction. 
2. Indian is defined various ways for purposes of federal 
programs, such as: 
• Employment assistance; 
• Vocational training; 
• Indian Child Welfare Act; 
• Education; and 
• Development programs 
3. Defendant is not recognized as an Indian by a tribe, 
society of Indians, or by the federal government. 
4. The State has met its burden of proving that the 
defendant is not an Indian and the state has jurisdiction to try 
him in this court. 
DATED this V day of 0<-r 2000. 
#t%r-
A. LYNN PAYNE 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MICHAEL L. HUMISTON 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN AND FOR L INTAH COl'NTY, STATE OF UTAH :iao" • ^ - ^ j T V 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff. 
vs 
JOSE R. VALDEZ, 
Defendant. 
DECISION 
Case No. 995800010 
The undersigned, having reviewed the reference pursuant to Rule 63, U.R.C.P., has 
reviewed carefully the affidavits of Wendall Navanick and Mary Meyer which were filed in 
support of the Motion to Disqualify Judge, and has independantly reviewed the affidavits and the 
complete file. 
It is the reviewing judge's opinion that the affidavits submitted do not set forth facts 
sufficient upon which to disqualify Judge Payne. The primary complaints and the affidavits 
seem to go against the way Judge Payne ruled on the issue. The affidavits themselves fail to 
show bias, prejudice, or appearance thereof. It is recognized at this point in time that because a 
ruling of a judge is not favorable to a party, that certainly is not grounds for removal based upon 
bias or prejudice. 
In carefully reviewing the file, it would appear to this judge that Judge Payne adequately 
complied with the law and made his ruling based upon the evidence. 
Having failed to find a sufficient basis in the affidavits for disqualification, the Court will 
refer the matter back to the judge in question. 
DATED this *y<l day of January, 2001. 
BY THE CQ 
WU. 
ohn R. Anderson, District Court Judge 
INSTRUCTION NO. u\ tf 
If you find that: 
ii) the defendant was intoxicated; and 
{2) a peace officer knew cr reasonably should have known 
that he was intoxicated to the degree he couldn't operate a motor 
vehicle safely; and 
(3) nonetheless the peace officer ordered the defendant to 
drive a motor vehicle on a public highway; and 
(4) the defendant would not have operated the vehicle but 
for the officer's order; and 
(5) at the time of the accident defendant was still acting* 
under such order; 
then you must find the defendant not guilty of both the offense 
charged and the lesser included offense. 
